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Unemployment Insurance, Unemployment Durations and 





We develop an empirical model to estimate the impact of UI on unemployment duration and 
reemployment wages. The model estimates the UI receipt, unemployment duration and 
re-employment wage equations simultaneously and incorporates unobserved heterogeneity 
variables in each equation and allows them to be correlated. The NLSY79 data is used to estimate 
the model. Some results are found support of the positive effect of UI on re-employment wages.   3
 
1. Introduction 
The disincentive effect of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits has been 
discussed extensively in the unemployment and UI literature. A substantial amount of 
empirical evidence has been found in support of the hypotheses that extending benefit 
durations or increasing benefit levels decrease the reemployment hazards and increase 
the joblessness durations of the unemployed.
1 However, UI receipt may have a 
positive effect on post-displacement wages.   
The difficulty in measuring the effect of UI is because the receipt of UI, the 
benefit level and duration are potentially endogenous. Individuals who expect a long 
unemployment spell and large earning drop may be more likely to claim benefits, UI 
recipients may be found to have relatively lower post-displacement wages than 
non-recipients. Little research has been done that estimates UI receipt, unemployment 
duration, and post-displacement earnings simultaneously while accounting for 
selectivity due to UI receipt and unobserved heterogeneity in UI receipt, 
unemployment duration, and subsequent wage.
2   
2.  Empirical  Model  
We develop a multi-episode, random-effects model of the duration of 
unemployment and re-employment wage following a job loss that allows the 
unobservable determinants of UI receipt to be correlated with the unobservable 
determinants of the unemployment duration and re-employment wage   
                                                        
1  These studies include the U.S. studies by Meyer (1990), Fallick (1991), and Card and Levine (2000) 
the Canadian study by Ham and Rea (1987).     
 
2  Devine and Kiefer (1991) summarize earlier findings on the effect of UI on post-displacement wages. 
Recent studies of UI and post-displacement wages include Addison and Blackburn (2000).     4
The model uses a discrete-time hazard model for unemployment durations (see 
Meyer, 1990). Let Ds be the time until the person becomes reemployed after the s
th job 
loss and let Cs be a censoring variable which equals one if the spell is incomplete. 
Define Ks = min{Ds, Cs}.  
The discrete hazard of re-employment at k weeks of unemployment is   
 (1)    ( | 1, , , ) 1 exp( exp( ) )
dd d d
s sk sk sk sk k PD k K k ξ ξλ ′′ => − = − − + xy x β y δ             
where xsk is a vector of exogenous (possibly-time varying) variables, ys is a vector of 
possibly endogenous variables and k λ are the baseline hazard parameters.   
Here the endogenous variables in the duration equation are all functions of one 
endogenous variable, UI receipt, which we denote by us and model by       
(2)   s P(u =1| , )=1-exp[ exp( )] 
uu u
s ξξ ′ − zz β                                        
where z is a vector of exogenous variables (which may include some variables from x) 
and
u ξ is an unmeasured variable that is assumed to be independent of z and x.  If 
d ξ and 
u ξ  are correlated then not explicitly modeling us may result in biased 
estimates of the parameters in (1).   
Finally, we assume that the re-employment wage after the s
th job loss, ws, is 
log-normally distributed: 
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lnw 1














xy                  
where,  φ  is the p.d.f. of a standard normal random variable, 
w σ  is its standard 
deviation,  s x  is a vector of exogenous variables and  s y  is a vector of endogenous 
variables both measured at the start of the job measured at the start. Here the 
endogenous variables in the wage equation are various functions of UI receipt and the 
duration of unemployment. While the conditional distribution (on
w ξ ) of w is   5
potential restrictive, the unconditional distribution being a mixture of log normally 
distributed random variables is more flexible.   
  Under (1) – (3), the likelihood function for the i
th individual is then 
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where G(
u ξ , ,
dw ξ ξ )  is the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters 
and csi is a censoring variable that equals 1 if the i
th individual’s unemployment spell 
is complete. We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity distribution has a 
mass-point specification in which there are R types of individuals in the population 
with type m having the unique pair
u (,,)
dw
mmm ξ ξξ  of “location” points and composing 
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3.  Data 
The sample of unemployment spells and re-employment wages is derived 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).    Here, we   6
constructed panel data containing individual weekly job histories up until the time of 
the 2002 survey.   
  All demographic variables are updated on a yearly basis and the value at the 
beginning of the year in which a job loss occurred is assigned to that particular job 
loss episode.   
  Using data on state UI rules contained in the Department of Labor’s semiannual 
publication  Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws we 
compiled state UI policy rules on such parameters as the maximum benefit amount. 
Based on these policy rules and weekly earnings history, we determined eligibility 
and calculated the weekly benefit amount (WBA) that individual's qualified for. We 
also determined whether a state required a waiting period, the maximum duration of 
regular benefits, and whether the state had extended benefits in a year. Moreover, 
state level variables based on administrative data were constructed for UI initial claim 
denial rates, on-going-claim denial rates, state average real WBA. Only 
unemployment spells where an individual did not return to the previous employer are 
included in the analysis. Selected summary statistics are reported in Table 1. A 
sample consists of a total of 13,387 spells of unemployment associated with 5732 
individuals.  
4.  Results 
The impact of UI receipt and unemployment durations on the re-employment 
wage are identified by the state's average denial rates and by spouse's past use of UI 
and by the time-varying nature of the state’s monthly unemployment rate over an 
unemployment spell. Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates of for a model with a 
three mass-point distribution. Here we discuss only coefficient estimates associated   7
with variables pertaining to UI system, in particular, WBA and duration of benefits, 
on re-employment wages. These are reported in column (3) of Table 2.   
Here we see that the impact of WBA for UI recipients on the re-employment 
wage as measured by the coefficient of WBA x UI is positive and statistically 
significant. This positive impact, however, is for unemployment spells equal to 1 
week. Thus, initially, a $100 increase in weekly benefits increases the re-employment 
wage by nearly 7 percent. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the 
interaction variable ui x spell x wba implies, however, that the impact dissipates with 
the length of the unemployment spell. Specifically, the effect of a $100 increase is 
zero after approximately 34 weeks of unemployment which is consistent with search 
models that predict that the reservation wage decreases smoothly to that of a 
non-recipient at the time of benefit exhaustion.   
The coefficient associated with the duration of regular UI benefits is positive and 
statistically significant and suggests that increasing the duration of UI benefits by 1 
week increases re-employment wages by approximately one percent. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we develop a random-effects panel data model, which jointly models 
probability of UI receipt, the unemployment duration and re-employment wage in 
each job loss episode of an individual, to estimate the impact of UI policy 
characteristics such as the weekly benefit level and regular benefit durations on an 
individual’s reemployment wage following a spell of unemployment. The model 
estimates show some evidence of the positive effect of WBA on re-employment 
wages but only for those with short unemployment durations. Empirical support was   8
also found for the notion that an increase in the regular duration of benefits increases 
re-employment wages which is also predicted by theoretical models of job search.       
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Variables  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
WBA  $142.83 $87.97 
UI receipt (UI)  0.22  
Claim Denial Rate  0.10  
Maximum Duration of Regular Benefits  20.22 8.77 
State has Waiting Week  0.82  
State had Extended Benefits in Year of Job Loss (EB) 0.67  
Denial Rate - On going claims  0.14  
State Average Real WBA in Year of Job Loss  $215.47 $35.41 
State Unemployment rate  7.17 2.29 
High Quarter Earnings  $4,449 $2,291 
Base Period Earnings  $12,576 $4,617 
Source: NLSY79. See text for details   10
 
 Table  2:    Model Estimates with Three Mass Point Unobserved Heterogeneity 
(n=13,387) 





Time-Constant Regressors  (1)  (2)  (3) 
WBA ($100)  0.4386  -  - 
   (0.0542)       
UI receipt (UI)  -  -1.3297  -0.0864 
      (0.2856)  (0.0756) 
WBA x UI  -  0.0909  0.0696 
      (0.0858)  (0.0320) 
Spell / 100  -  -  -0.0518 
         (0.0384) 
Spell x UI/ 100  -  -  0.1716 
         (0.1846) 
WBA x Spell x UI / 100  -  -  -0.2074 
         (0.0879) 
Claim Denial Rate  1.4664  -0.0301  0.5687 
   (1.0129)  (0.0086)  (0.2763) 
Maximum Duration of Regular Benefits  0.0213  -  .01090 
   (0.0055)     (0.0011) 
State has Waiting Week  0.1503  -  0.0180 
   (0.1582)     (0.0431) 
State had Extended Benefits in Year of Job Loss (EB)  0.1342  0.0096  -0.0188 
   (0.1305)  (0.0702)  (0.0357) 
UI x EB  -  0.1320  0.0783 
      (0.0595)  (0.0385) 
Denial Rate - On going claims  0.2579  0.0786  -0.1718 
   (0.5453)  (0.1469)  (0.1584) 
State Average Real WBA in Year of Job Loss  0.0018  0.3064  0.0008 
   (0.0015)  (0.2433)  (0.0005) 
State unemployment rate / 10  0.6339  -0.0016  -0.0890 
   (0.1953)  (0.0007)  (0.0606) 
Spouse Received UI in Past  0.5095  -0.1603  - 
   (0.1390)  (0.0637)    
Male x Spouse Received UI in Past  0.2089  -0.0024  0.0000 
   (0.2327)  (0.0594)  (0.0000) 
Time-Varying Regressors            
State Unemployment Rate  -  -3.4951  - 
      (1.1606)    
Remaining Weeks of Regular Benefits (WRB)  -  -2.6286  - 
      (1.6674)    
UI  x  EB  x  Spell  Week/  100  -  0.5677  - 
      (0.4933)      11
UI x EB x Spell Week Squared/ 10000  -  -0.0030  - 
      (0.0039)    
UI x EB x Spell Week Cubed/100000  -  119.0140  - 
      (28.9396)    
UI x    WRB x Spell Week/100  -  -90.7105  - 
      (35.4943)    
UI x WRB x Spell Week Squared/10000  -  1.7171  - 
      1.2082    
UI x WRB x Spell Week Cubed/100000  -  11.6694  - 
      (2.7730)    
UI x Spell Week/100  -  -2.6774  - 
      (0.7582)    
UI x Spell Week Squared/10000  -  0.1707  - 
      (0.0571)    
UI x Spell Week Cubed/100000  -  -1.0538  - 
      (0.9531)    
UI x    WBA x Spell Week/100  -  0.3204  - 
      (0.2779)    
UI x WBA x Spell Week Squared/10000  -  -0.0022  - 
      (0.0022)    
UI x WBA x Spell Week Cubed/100000  -  -0.0022  - 
      (0.0021)    
Log Likelihood=-119,225.64 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Data from the NLSY79, see text for details. Estimations also include controls for 
gender, race , marital status, age, age squared, number of children, children 0-2, live with parents, family size,  years of 
schooling, AFQT percentile, health limitations, interactions of gender with race, age, marital status, and living with parents, 
tenure, tenure squared, union status, lost job due to plant closing, industry, occupation, state of residence, resides in SMSA, 
month of job loss, year of job loss, dummies for high quarter earnings indicating whether high quarter earnings were between 0-1, 
1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-5, 5-6, 6-7, 7-8, 8-9, and 9-10 thousand dollars and dummies for base period earnings indicating whether base 
period earnings were between 0-2, 2-4, 4-6, 6-8, 8-10, 10-12, 12-14, 14-16, 16-18, 18-20, 20-25 and 25-30 thousand dollars. 
 
 
 